

6

181738





KALYĀNA MANJUSHĀ

OR

THE CASKET OF BLESSINGS

BEING

AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF SANSKRIT LOGIC



अहं कर्त्तव्यं मानः महाकृष्णाहिदंशितः ।
नाहं कर्त्तति विश्वासामृतं पीत्वा सुखीभव ॥



BY

BODHIANUNDĀNATH SWAMI.



CALCUTTA:

PUBLISHED BY TARAGOTI BHATTACHARJEE,
NO. 1, HARRINGTON STREET.



R.M.C LIBRARY	
No.	181738
Class No.	181.435 181.435
Date	20.9.96
St. Card	M.S.G
Class.	SB
Cat	SB
Bk. Card.	✓
Checked	SB

CALCUTTA:

PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.

1893.

ERRATA

Page	Line	for	Prayogana	read	Prayojana
1	7		Sarka		Tarka
"	10	"	Nirgrahasthana	"	Nirgrahasthana
"	15	"	Avayadar	"	Avayava
10	4	"	Atiganta	"	Atiyanta
12	21	"	Infinitesimally	"	Infinitesimally
16	18	"		"	
17	10	"	Cayda	"	Savda
18	6	"	Sa vikalpa	"	Savikalpa
"	14	"	Sa vikalpa	"	Savikalpa
20	25	"	Vissana Bhada	"	Vissana Bhava
23	"	"	Abhada	"	Abhava
24	1	"	Sadikalpa	"	Savikalpa
"	12	"	Apla	"	Apta
29	2	"	Infinitesimally	"	Infinitesimally
33	27	"		"	

PREFACE.

*The conviction that "I am not the lord,"
like a draught of nectar, confers immortality ;
while the end of the passion of self-exaltation
is death.*

The work of compiling this little book, entitled '*Kalyána Manjushá* : or an Exposition of the Principles of Sanskrit Logic,' and a work of much labor and difficulty is concluded to-day ; but a few words are needed by way of preface.

The system of the Nyáya Philosophy furnishes the only adequate method of investigation of truth, especially the truth of the ancient *Sas-tras*. Its whole scope is the discussion of truth and the determination of doubt. The teachings of the first Professors of the science present a few points of difference, which would require much reading and research to ascertain what is incontrovertible.

Owing now-a-days* to the predominance of Western ideas, manners, customs and civiliza-

tion, our men of wealth and commerce are observed to be ever ready to import and imitate what is foreign, disregarding the teachings and injunctions of the ancient *Rishis* as stark superstition. Thus, for want of aid and encouragement, the cultivation of Sanskrit learning has declined, until Sanskrit schools and Professors, worthy of the name, have nearly disappeared. Under the circumstances, it would seem that a true knowledge of the *Sastras* could only be brought home to the people through the médium of the current Bengali language. But it would not be easy by means of short compendiums to show how the civil polity sanctioned by, and enunciated in, the *Sastras* was the outcome of the experience of centuries. Hence it is clearly the duty of the people of this country to endeavour to resuscitate Sanskrit learning, with a view to the spread and prosecution of the knowledge of the *Sastras*. Failing in this, it is hopeless to expect that our social, moral and spiritual condition will be ameliorated by the mere imitation and adaptation of Western civilization. So long as this fatal weakness on our part is not completely overcome, the hope of one day breaking the trammels of foreign domination is as baseless as that of assuaging one's thirst in a mirage.

If the learned would kindly peruse this book, I should feel repaid for some of the labor bestowed on its compilation : should they have doubts on any points herein discussed, and bring them to my notice by letter, or by correspondence in the newspapers, I should be happy to reply to them.

No. 1, Harrington St., { BODHANĀNDANATH SWAMI,
Calcutta. { (alias)
INDRA CHUNDRA SINGHA.

HYMN TO SIVA.

I WORSHIP the great *Mahesa*, who shines like ten million suns; who is adorned with triple eyes*; who is crowned with the moon; who is armed with the trident, the bow, the mace, the discus, the goad, and the noose;

Who is the eternal Lord;

Who is bright as the snowy summit of mount Kailāṣe; whose matted hair is ablaze with the crescent moon;

Whose triple eyes are fixed on the tip of the nose in silent meditation;

Who is seated in the tranquil posture († *vīraśana*) of contemplation;

Whose arms are encircled with coils of snakes; and who is attended by holy sages.

In the lotus of my heart, I constantly meditate upon him;

Whose body is white as snow, whose bracelets and necklaces are snakes;

Whose body is besmeared with ashes;

* Ravi, Sasi, and Vaiṣṇānara.

† *Vīraśana* means squatting with the right leg crossed on the left leg, the left heel passing under and pressing against the fundament.

Whose hands hold the head of a deer, and
a battle-axe ;

Whose forehead is adorned with the bright
half-moon ;

Whose fingers are interlaced to typify a
deer ;*

Whose long arms adorn (*i.e.*, reach as far
as) the knees, and

Whose face beams with benevolence.

* This mystical form is enjoined as a discipline for
the practice of *Yoga*.

DEDICATION.

DEDICATED to the beautiful feet of the paramount Lord and Teacher of saintly anchorites, Sri Swāmi Ganesa Chaturbedi of Muttra.

O Guru !

A glance from your eye of holy compassion has laid the awful winds and waves which threatened with instant destruction the sinking bark of my life, till assisted by favouring breezes, it has resumed its course in smooth waters, and now bids fair to regain its destination. Without the aid of your holy company and conversation, which fortunately fell to my lot, there was no hope of escape for me from the troubles and temptations of this world.

Compared with your immense learning, this little book which I dedicate to the lotus of your beautiful feet, is like a drop of Ganges water offered in worshipping the vast white ocean. Should you deign to give it a place on the lotus of your beautiful feet, I should think my labors crowned with success.

In conclusion, your ransomed pupil and follower prostrates himself before you, and prays

that you will, with your usual benignity, overlook the imperfections of this work, and any other faults into which he might have been unconsciously led contrary to your injunctions. This is all he asks.

The Prostrated

Bodhanundánath Swami.

KALYĀNA MANJUSHĀ
OR
THE CASKET OF BLESSINGS,
BEING
AN EXPOSITION OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF SANSKRIT LOGIC.

The attainment of beatitude consists in the knowledge of the truth as to the following sixteen categories (Padārtha):—

(1), *Pramāna*, proof or the means by which a right knowledge may be gained; (2), *Prameya*, or the objects of thought; (3), *Sansaya*, doubt; (4), *Prayogana*, purpose or motive; (5), *Dristānta*, instance or example; (6), *Siddhānta*, established conclusion; (7), *Avayava*, member or part; (8), *Sarka*, disputation; (9), *Nirnaya*, ascertainment; (10), *Vāda*, controversy; (11), *Jalpa*, wrangling; (12), *Vitandā*, objection or cavilling; (13), *Hetwābhāsa*, fallacy; (14), *Chhala*, quibbling; (15), *Jāti*, futile replies; (16), *Nirgasthāna*, conclusion, on confounding of an adversary.

This knowledge may be gained by means of (1), Enunciation (*uddesa*); (2), Definition (*lakshana*); and (3), Investigation (*pariksha*).

Q. What is Enunciation ?

A. Enunciation is the statement of the name of an object.

Explanation :—The above-mentioned sixteen categories, *viz.*,—*Pramāna*, &c., are so many names. They singly and collectively form subjects of enunciation. In other words, a term is necessary to denote an object. It is the notation or 'enunciation of it.

Q. What should I gather from the word Enunciation ?

A. A knowledge of the name of an object.

Explanation :—When I hear the letters O and X which go to form the word Ox, pronounced together, all that I learn is a name only. The object for which the name stands does not appear before the eye; only its name is perceived by the ear. Hence enunciation is mentioning a thing by its name, or by a term made up of certain letters of the alphabet.

Q. By which of our senses do we perceive a name ?

A. A name is perceived by the ear. Hence the sense of hearing is the instrument by means of which we come to know the name of an

object. This knowledge, then, derived from our sense of hearing, unaided by that of sight or touch, is Enunciation.

Q. What is Definition ?

A. Definition is the description of an object by its peculiar and essential properties.

Explanation :—the peculiar property should be such as may be always observed in a certain connection and in no other. If observed in another connection, it cannot form a peculiar sign or definition.

Explanation :—An ox is known by its dew-lap.

Q. What is a dew-lap ?

A. A dew-lap is the loose flesh about the throat of an ox. It is only seen in cattle of this kind. Such a peculiarity constitutes a sign or definition.

Q. What is Investigation ?

A. Investigation is the examination of an object with regard to its peculiar properties. Rightly to comprehend the foregoing sixteen categories, we must first learn to enunciate, define and investigate correctly. These three branches of discussion, *viz.*—enunciation, definition and investigation must therefore be mastered at the outset. Now we will treat of the first of the sixteen categories, *viz.*, *Prāmāṇa*.

Of Pramāna :—

Pramāna is the instrument of *the Pramā*.

Q. What is *Pramā* ?

A. *Pramā* is the correct knowledge or measure of a subject.

Q. What is correct knowledge ?

A. Knowledge may be either correct or incorrect. The latter may arise from doubt, perversion and disputation.

Q. What is doubt ?

A. For example, a tree is in sight, but you hesitate to affirm whether it is a tree or not. This state of mind is doubt.

Q. What is perversion ?

A. Perversion is the taking of a thing to be that which it is not, *e. g.*, when you see a distant tree without leaves, and take it to be a man, or some other object, it is called perversion.

Q. What is disputation ?

A. For example, two persons going the same way, see the trunk of a tree. One of them takes it to be a man : while the other affirms it to be a heap of earth. This conference or dialogue of two persons, maintaining adverse positions, is called disputation.

There is another and fourth source of incorrect knowledge, originating in the past re-

collection of an object; *e. g.*, sometime ago I visited a distant country of which I retain some recollections. This knowledge may prove incorrect. For who can say whether the country is now in precisely the same state as when I saw it?

Thus correct knowledge is the exact notion of an object, free from doubt, perversion, disputation and errors of memory.

For instance, a tree becomes visible from a distance. The knowledge from actual sight that it is a tree and nothing else, is an example of correct knowledge. This correct knowledge is called *Pramā*.

Q. Now what is an instrument?

A. That which produces an action or effect is its cause. That by which an action is efficiently produced is its instrument.

Q. Explain more clearly what is meant by cause?

A. Cause is that which invariably precedes an effect, which, without the cause, could not be; *e. g.*, twist, warp and woof are the cause of cloth, the latter being the product of the former. They existed before the cloth was produced, and without them the cloth could not be produced. This invariable sequence is called law.

Q. Should a donkey be present at the place of manufacture before the production of the cloth, which it is required to carry to the market, is it to be taken as the cause of the cloth, because it happens to be present before the cloth is woven ?

A. Though the donkey may be present before the cloth is produced, yet there is nothing in the donkey, the absence of which will prevent the production of the cloth. It has been explained above ; that that which invariably precedes, and in the absence of which the effect cannot be produced, is its cause. But the absence of the donkey cannot prevent the production of the cloth. Hence the donkey cannot be the cause of the cloth. The uniformity of sequence referred to, not existing in the donkey, it cannot be taken as a cause.

Q. The color of the twist of which the cloth is made, has always existed before the production of the cloth. Is it therefore the cause of the cloth ?

A. The color of the twist is the cause of the color of the cloth. It is not the cause of the cloth.

It is seen, therefore, that that which invariably precedes an effect, which otherwise could not be, is its *cause*.

Of Effect.

Q. What is an effect ?

A. That which invariably follows or proceeds from a cause, and could not otherwise be, is the effect of that *cause*.

The Vedantists have propounded a different definition of cause, which does not appear to be correct. It is quoted below :—

“The relation of cause and effect results from the principle of *Anwaya* (concomitance) and *Vyatireka* (non-concomitance), or of invariable concomitance of affirmatives and negatives.”

Q. What is *Anwaya* ?

A. It is the principle of invariable concomitance of affirmatives, *e. g.* A is where B is; *i. e.*, whenever the product exists, the material cause thereof exists; as curd is made from milk.

Q. What is *Vyatireka* ?

A. It is the principle of the invariable concomitance of negatives, *e. g.*, A is not where B is not: *i. e.*, when the material cause no longer exists, the product no longer exists, as curd cannot be made without milk. This conclusion is not conclusive. For things which are eternal and universal have a cause. They have existed and must continue to exist. For

we cannot conceive their non-existence. Yet they too have a cause, which, according to the Vedantists, should combine in itself the principle of concomitance of affirmatives as well as negatives. But the principle of the concomitance of negatives has no application in the instance adduced. Hence the definition is erroneous.

Of Cause and Effect.

There are three kinds of *causes*, viz., substantial, non-substantial, and instrumental. Substantial or material cause always remains joined to the effect.

Explanation :—Yarn is the material cause of cloth ; because it is the stuff of which cloth is made and because it is not in substance distinct from cloth. The weaver's tools, the loom, &c., are the instrumental cause of cloth ; because though they are necessary for the production of cloth, yet they are distinct from it. But why should not the weaver's tools, &c., be taken as the substantial cause of cloth even as yarn ?

The answer is, because, so long as they co-exist, the yarn continues united with the cloth ; while the weaver's tools, &c., cease to be joined to the cloth after its production. Hence, the weaver's tools, the loom, and the skill of

the weaver are the instrumental or efficient cause of cloth, and not its substantial or material cause.

Connection (*Samvandha*) is two-fold, *i. e.*, either simple conjunction (*Samyoga*), as that of the loom and the cloth; or intimate or constant relation or co-inherence (*Samavāya*). It exists only in things which cannot exist separately. (*Ayuta Siddha**) such as the relation which exists between a body and the parts of which it is made up, between a substance and its qualities, between an action and its agent, between a genus or species and its individuals, and between individuality and eternal substance. They, *i. e.*, the body and its parts, &c. exist in constant and intimate relation with each other, and they only separate the moment after their destruction. The co-inherence gone, the object is gone. The destruction of cloth follows that of the yarn of which it is made. The loss of its qualities follows the destruction of the substance (or to speak more accurately) the loss occurs the moment immediately after the destruction, a moment being

* That which exists immediately before the destruction of two objects "things" conjointly with one another supporting each other, such connection of such two objects is called *Samyoga Samvandha* or *Ayuta Siddha*.

defined as the small space of time taken to utter the word *guna* (or quality). The cloth and yarn stand to each other in the relation of *Avayavi* and *Avayadar*, or as the whole and its parts. Hence their mutual relation is one of co-inherence. But the connection of the loom and cloth is nothing more than simple conjunction. The one does not remain always joined to the other, nor is their relation intimate and constant. It has been explained above that substantial cause is that which co-inheres in the effect, hence the yarn is the cause, the cloth the effect. The yarn is the substantial cause of cloth, the cloth of its qualities, such as shape, color, &c., in the same way as clay is the substantial cause of the jar, and the jar the substantial cause of its shape and other qualities.

Q. When a jar is being made, it is not possible to distinguish cause and effect. The cause must first arise; from it, the effect. But the jar and its qualities being produced together, it is not possible to ascertain clearly their relation as cause and effect. Even as the horns of a cow which grow together, and which yet do not stand in the relation of cause and effect. For if one is broken short, the other remains intact. Hence qualities cannot be

substantial causes, because in such cases, cause is present in force.

A. A thing and its qualities are not produced simultaneously. A thing is without its qualities when first made ; the qualities come into existence the moment after its production. If you admit the simultaneous production of a thing and its qualities, then you must also admit that they proceed from the same cause and that they always exist together. But it has been shown above, that if cause can be separated from the effect, the latter would continue to exist by itself. Therefore the pot is first made without its qualities, which later come into existence. For this reason, the pot is the cause of its qualities. It follows also that their causes are different, because the pot cannot be its own cause. It is one and individual, and cannot exist before or after itself. Therefore the pot is the cause of its qualities and not its own cause.

Q. But if you say that the pot is at first without its qualities, then it must follow that it cannot be seen at the moment of its production. For things having definite form can only be seen, and those without such form are invisible. For example, air is invisible. A thing having size and form can alone be seen.

Hence the pot at the moment of its production should not be taken as a thing, for a thing must have its dimensions and other qualities.

A. It does not affect the argument even if it is supposed that the pot, on the first moment of its production, is without dimensions, and cannot be seen. For if you admit that the pot is endowed with all its qualities from the moment it is taken in hand, then how is it that it is not seen as a whole from the moment it is thrown into the mould. Hence the pot is without its qualities on the first instant of its completion; on the second and following instants it becomes visible. It is not denied though that on the first instant, a thing corresponding to the word "pot" does not exist.

The substantial cause of an object may also be one of its peculiar characteristics, as well as the substratum of its qualities. Substratum may be defined as that in which there is not an absolute non-existence (*Atiganta abhāva*) of those qualities. Absolute non-existence is absence or negation in all time; *i. e.*, in the past, present, and future. For example, the absence of oil from sand. It is a thing which has not been, cannot be, nor will ever be extracted from sand.

Of non-substantial cause.

Non-substantial cause is immanent in the substantial cause and is associated in one and the same object (as a necessarily immanent cause) with the substantial cause and effect; as the weaving of yarn in forming cloth. Yarn is the substantial cause of cloth and the weaving of the threads of yarn its non-substantial cause.

Q. Why is the weaving of yarn called a cause?

A. Because the weaving of the yarn invariably precedes the production of cloth, which is the effect, and because without the weaving the cloth cannot be produced. Thus the weaving of the yarn which answers the definition of cause is taken as a cause of the production of the cloth. It is the non substantial cause of the cloth, because it is immanent in the substantial cause, *viz.*, the yarn. Again, the color of the threads is the non-substantial cause of the color of the cloth, because the color of the threads existed before or preceded the color of the cloth; the latter, in fact, originating in the former.

Q. Allowing that the color of the cloth is a non-substantial cause, then why should not each of its other qualities be likewise taken as

such a cause? Otherwise, how is it that the color of the yarn is the non-substantial cause of the color of the cloth?

A. The qualities of the cloth appear consequently after the production of the cloth. Hence they cannot be causes; whereas the color of the yarn, which is the substantial cause of the cloth, existed antecedently to the weaving of the cloth and hence it is a non-substantial cause.

Of Instrumental Cause.

That which is neither a substantial nor a non-substantial cause and yet efficacious as a cause, is called instrumental cause. It is the active, effective agent, while substantial cause is passive, yielding itself to be acted on by it. For example, the loom, the weaver's brush, and the weaver, are the instrumental causes of cloth. The substantial cause co-inheres in positive things, and is absent from negative. But the instrumental cause is so called, because it is not even absent from the latter.

The chief or special cause by which an object is efficiently produced, is called its instrument (*káрана*).

For example, the hunter and his bow are the causes, but the arrow is the instrument of the death of the game, because the arrow is

more efficiently instrumental in causing the death than either the hunter or his bow. The hunter may take the bow in his hand, place the arrow in the rest, brace the bow and then let fly the arrow. But he will not kill the game so long as the arrow does not hit it. Hence it is the arrow which kills the game, and is the instrument of its death. In that view, *Pramána* is the instrument of *Pramá*; in other words, the efficient or special cause of actual knowledge.

The Definition of Pramána according to the Vedantists.

Pramána or proof is that by which we arrive at a knowledge of an unknown object.

This definition is not altogether faultless; as will appear from the following example:—

A person comes across a jar for the first time in his life. It is his first sight of such an object. The eye is its *Pramána*, in other words, the instrument of its actual knowledge. There is no evidence of it, except the eye by which it has been seen, and which will continue to see it so long as it is in sight. The notion of the jar acquired on the first instance, is that of an unknown object; while on the second instant and the third the notion acquired by the eye is that of a known object. But

according to the definition given by the *Ve-*
dantists, *Pramána* is the instrument of the
 knowledge of an unknown and not a known
 object. On the second and third instants,
 however, the eye acquires a knowledge of a
 known object. Hence the above definition is
 insufficient.

But it may be said, that by repeated sight
 of a known object, we acquire at each sight a
 new notion of that object, because repeated
 observation makes the object older and older
 every successive instant. To this it may be
 replied, that there is nothing inherent in the
 object to show that it becomes old at a parti-
 cular instant.

It will be seen that an instant, or the time
 taken to acquire an altered or new notion of
 the jar by sight only, is infinitessimally small,
 so that it can hardly be perceived by the
 senses. It follows then that we must imagine
 the efflux of time from instant to instant. If
 then the effect produced in an instant, be
 held to be distinct and indivisible, we must
 also hold that the time taken to effect the
 meeting of two out-stretched fingers to be
 equal to one instant instead of four instants,
viz., the first or the instant of the incipient
 approach of the fingers towards each other ;

the second or the instant of their leaving their own places; the third or the instant of their arriving at their destination; and the fourth, or the instant of their meeting or conjunction. In other words, a single instant, *viz.*, the instant of their conjunction, must be viewed as four distinct instants. If so, we should be able to form a distant notion of their separate existence. Thus an instant must be supposed either as an infinitessimally small space of time that can be realized only by the imagination, or four such instants go to make but one instant, which is absurd. Hence the hypothesis is erroneous.

The definition of *Pramána* given in a previous chapter must therefore be correct, *viz.*, *Pramána* is the instrument of *Pramá*.

Q. There are then many causes of *Pramá* (the first right knowledge) such as the recipient of knowledge as well as the object of knowledge, which must be included in the category of instruments instead of causes?

A. Although the recipient of knowledge and its object may both be present, yet a knowledge of it is not possible, so long as the eye does not come in contact with it. The conjunction of an organ of sense and its object is the instrument of *Pramá*. The rest are causes only.

Pramána is the instrument of *Pramá*, and is of four kinds, *viz.*, (1) Perception by the senses, (*Pratyaksha*); (2) Inductive generalizations, (*Anumāna*); (3) Recognition of similarity, (*Upamāna*); and (4) Authoritative assertion, (*Āvda*). Of these four-fold proofs, that by which perception is produced, is called an instrument. Perception is the knowledge of the external object derived from our senses. For example, we do not get an idea of an elephant from a mere verbal description of it, until we actually see the quadruped. Perception is of two kinds (1) *Nirvikalpa* or that which does not pay regard to an alternative, and *sa vikalpa*, or that which does. The knowledge which does not pay regard to an alternative is that which includes no specification, and the knowledge which does contemplate an alternative is that which involves a specification. The instruments of the knowledge which involves a specification are three-fold. Sometimes the senses are the instruments, sometimes the conjunction of the organs of sense and their objects, and sometimes knowledge itself.

The order of thought is as follows. First the conjunction of the soul with mind; next the conjunction of the mind with the organs of sense, and last the conjunction of the organs

of sense with their objects. From this last conjunction, arises knowledge or perception. This knowledge is so *Nirvikalpa*, a term applied to the knowledge of a thing which has no qualities (such as genus, &c.) that we know of. For example, when a thing first comes in sight, its genus, name, &c. are unknown; all our knowledge regarding it being the simple cognition that "this is something." This knowledge involves no specification, for we cannot say, with any degree of certainty that it is such a thing. Of this knowledge the organs of sense are the instruments, in the sense that an axe is the instrument of hewing.

As hewing is the function of an axe, so is a particular organ of sense functioned to convey to the mind a particular kind of knowledge. For instance, when the eye sees an object, we derive so much of a knowledge of it as can be gathered from sight only. We see something we know not what. The eye is the instrument of visual knowledge or cognition. In other words, each organ of sense is the instrument of a particular kind of knowledge. The conjunction of an organ of sense with the object is an operation (*Vyápāra*). The stroke of an axe is an operation, and the hewing of the wood is the effect. Similarly, the conjunction

of an organ of sense with its object is an operation. The simple cognition or knowledge that "this is something," is the effect of an operation of that organ. Again, the conjunction of the organ of sense with its object, whereby we arrive at a simple cognition of it, as well as a knowledge of its specific character, is an instrument. Simple cognition involves an operation which is followed by a knowledge of a name, a species, and a quality, such as "this is a Bráhma-
mana," "this is black," "this is a fruit," &c. Subsequently, we arrive at a knowledge which regulates the acceptance or rejection of the first knowledge. There are objects of which either of the above two kinds of knowledge is impossible, there is abstraction only. A knowledge of a generic character abstracted from the objects to which it might belong, is all that is possible in such cases; such as the generic nature of a water-jar (*Ghatatwa*). Of these three kinds of knowledge, the simple cognition that this is something is called *Nirvikalpa* and it is an instrument. Simple cognition added to a knowledge of the specific character of an object is called *sa vikalpa* knowledge, such as, it is something, and it is a Bráhma-
mana. Such knowledge or perception involves an intermediate operation. The foregoing three

kinds of knowledge are the products of the intellect (*Buddhi*.) There are philosophers who maintain that the organs of sense only are instruments. According to this hypothesis the senses are the instruments, all else are operations.

The mutual proximity of a sense and its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds, *viz.*, (1) conjunction, (*Samyoga*); (2) intimate union with that which is in conjunction, (*Samyukta-Samavāya*); (3) inherence in what inheres in that which is in conjunction, (*Samyukta-Samaveta-Samavāya*); (4) inherence, (*Samavāya*); (5) inherence in that which inheres, (*Samaveta-Samavāya*); (6) the relation between a distinctive circumstance and that which is thereby distinguished, (*Vishesya Vishesana-bhāva*).

For example, when a jar is perceived by the eye, there is (between the sense and its object) the proximity of conjunction (*Samyoga*). Similarly, when the internal organ, mind, discusses spiritual matters, there is proximity of conjunction of mind and soul. In the perception of the colour of a jar, there is proximity through inherence in that which is in conjunction, (*Samyukta Samavāya*), because the colour inheres in the jar, which is in conjunction with

the organ of vision. Similarly, in the perception of pleasure and pain, which are in the soul, there is proximity through inherence in what is inconjunction, because pleasure and pain inhere in the soul, which is in conjunction with the internal organ, mind."

To ascertain the qualities of a jar, (*e. g.*, its age), it must be viewed in four different connections, which are so many instruments of a knowledge of those qualities. The conjunction of the eye and the jar, and the intimate union of the jar and its qualities, are not enough to determine whether a jar, seen at a distance, is old or new. When the minute particles of an object (jar) come into close proximity to the minute particles of an organ of sense (eye), and *vice versa*, then there is the perception of the qualities of the jar and the genus to which those qualities belong. This perception is the result of the relation called the proximity of inherence in what inheres in that which is in conjunction (*Sanyukta-Samaveta-Samavaya*).

Q. Why is the relation called *Sanyukta-Samaveta-Samavaya* relation?

A. The proximity of the eye and the jar is the proximity of conjunction (*Samyoga*); the qualities of the jar being permanently inherent in it, their relation is that of inherence (*Sam-*

yoga); again the relation of the specific qualities and their genera is also a relation of inherence (*Samavaya*). Hence the *Samyukta-Samaveta-Samavaya* relation is the proximity of inherence in what inheres in that which is in conjunction. For example in the perception of genus, the fact that it is a color, there is the above-mentioned relation, because the fact of being a color inheres in that particular color, which inheres in the jar, which is in conjunction with the organ of vision.

In the perception of sound by the organ of hearing, the proximity is that of inherence (*Samavaya*) because the organ of hearing consists of ether which resides in the cavity of the ear, and sound is a quality of ether and a quality inheres in that of which it is a quality.

In the perception that it is a sound, (in the case of any particular sound of which we are cognizant) the proximity is that of inherence in what inheres (*Samaveta-Samavaya*) because the fact of being a sound resides in the organ of hearing.

Q. What is meant by the relation of *Viśeṣya Viśeṣana bhāda* (or the relation between a distinctive circumstances and that which is distinguished)?

A. In the perception of non-existence

(*Abhada*). This proximity is through the relation of a distinctive circumstance and that which is thereby distinguished; because in the case of a jar once seen in a room, but now not seen there, when we perceive “the room is possessed of the non-existence of the jar,” the perceived non-existence of a jar distinguishes the room, which is in conjunction with the organ of vision. The varieties of non-existence are described below:—

Perception by the senses is of two kinds, *Sudikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa*. Its instruments are three, and the relations in which it originates are six as explained above.

Of Inference.

Induction (*anumāna*) is the consideration of a sign.

Explanation.—Smoke is the sign of fire. Inference (*anumiti*) is the knowledge that results from the consideration of a sign, as the knowledge of the existence of fire inferred from the existence of smoke. Induction is the instrument of inference; as this room has smoke; therefore it has fire. Inference is divided into five parts or members. For example.

(1) Smoke is seen [to rise from the hearth] at the time of cooking.

(2) By repeated observation [of this fact] it is ascertained that without fire there can be no smoke.

(3) Smoke is seen on the mountain, &c.

(4) The fact is recollected that without fire there can be no smoke.

(5) Hence the conclusion that there is fire in the smoky places, such as the mountain, etc.

A correct inference cannot be drawn where the limitation or qualifying condition (*Upādhi*) is wanting. Fire always underlies smoke, but smoke does not always accompany fire; and the proposition that smoke accompanies fire requires a qualifying condition that there must be moist fuel, which may not be present where there is fire. For instance, in a red hot shell there is fire, but no smoke. Hence fire may be present without being invariably attended by smoke.

Q. Is the five-fold process of inference described above necessary for determining the existence of fire, from the smoke rising from the culinary hearth, even when fire is at hand?

That fire accompanies smoke is not an ascertained fact when first observed. But granting that the fact is ascertained by constant observation and knowledge of the law, yet there would be no necessity of an inference from

smoke that there is fire when the fire is actually present. When I see the fire with my own eyes, where is the necessity of an inference of its existence from that fact of combustion of fuel? Hence it follows that an inference is necessary only in doubtful cases.

A regular process of inference or induction is of two kinds, inasmuch as it may be employed for instructing oneself and for convincing others. The five processes described above in the beginning of this chapter are intended for informing one's own mind; the other process which also consists of five parts, is intended for the information of others, and is described below:—

- (1) This hill is fiery.
- (2) This hill has smoke; therefore it is fiery.
- (3) Whenever there is smoke there is fire;
- (4) A blazing furnace.
- (5) This hill also has smoke, therefore it has fire; in other words, because smoke is seen on this hill, therefore it has fire.

By this five-fold process of reasoning, it is proved that a smoky hill is fiery. The fact of the hill smoking or the second part of the above process, is called *hetu* or reason. This reason is characterized by the principle of con-

comitance of affirmatives and negatives; *e. g.* Fire is, where smoke is; and fire is not, where smoke is not. The principle of the origin of a finite object is its reason. The analogy drawn from the existence of an eternal substance is its reason. But it involves the principle of the concomitance of affirmatives only. A thing is nameable, if it is cognizable, as a jar. It can also furnish an analogous example, or counterpart. A thing which is not cognizable is not nameable; neither can it furnish an analogous example. Hence this reason involves the concomitance of affirmatives only. That reason from the non-existence of which an analogous example can be drawn, only involves the concomitance of negatives. For example:—

(1) Earth is different from the other elements.

(2) Because it is odorous.

(3) What is inodorous is not earth, as water.

What is different from the three kinds of reason described above is called a fallacy; or *hetwāvāsa*. The five kinds of fallacy and their definitions, as well as the five parts or members of an inference are of little practical utility, and their further discussion has therefore been omitted from this work.

Of Comparison.

The knowledge of an unknown object may be derived as an inference from a knowledge of its similarity (*Upamāna*) with a known object. This inference (*Upamāniti*) involves the recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance. For example, a person, not knowing what is meant by the word *Gavaya* (*bos Gravaeus*), hears it described as a quadruped resembling a cow. Should he happen to meet in the forest an animal like a cow, he at once remembers the purport of what he has been told. Thereupon an inference from similarity arises in his mind that this is what is meant by the word *Gavaya*. It is a method of proof by comparison.

Testimony.

Sound is a quality of ether, and is of two kinds, inarticulate and articulate. Inarticulate sounds are those which cannot be represented by the letters of the alphabet; such as a clap of thunder, and report of cannon, &c. Articulate sounds are those which can be represented by the letters of the alphabet; such as a word or a sentence, &c. Words are made up of letters, and sentences of words. Speech or authoritative assertion is either true

or untrue. The speech of one who speaks the truth (*áplá*) and is infallible amounts to proof and is conclusive. The cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence (without which a sentence would else be unintelligible) is expectancy (*A'kánkshá*), compatibility (*Yogyatá*) and juxta-position (*Sauriñhi*).

Expectancy means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning in the absence of another word which, when it comes, as expected, helps to complete the construction and the sense.

Compatibility consists in a word's not having a meaning incompatible with that of other words in the sentence. In other words, whatever sense is possible to be brought in to complete the meaning of a sentence, is compatibility.

Juxta-position consists in the enunciation of the words having expectancy without a long pause between them.

The agreement of expected words is juxta-position.

For instance, the sentence "fetch water" consists of two words "fetch" and "water." They have expectancy, compatibility, and juxta-position, which completes the meaning. Without these three qualities or connections, no

sentence can have a meaning. For instance, if the word "water" only is pronounced, the person addressed would expect the other word; not knowing what he should do with the water. Again, if the word "fetch" be pronounced, he should expect the other word, not knowing what to fetch. But if he hears the sentence, "fetch water," then he expects no other word, as the meaning is complete. Again, if the word "fetch" be pronounced first, and then after a long pause, the word "water" be added, the words will convey no meaning, as they are not in juxta-position. Hence juxta-position is the cause of the mutual agreement of two words having compatibility and expectancy. 181738

Hence a sentence or assertion can have no meaning without the three qualities of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position. But a sentence or assertion, whether right or wrong, if correctly connected, will convey a meaning, though it is the former only which is calculated to serve the purposes of *Pramāna*, which is another name of truth.

Pramāna or instrument of right knowledge is of four kinds according to the division of perception by the sense (*Pratyaksha*); inductive generalization, (*Anumāna*); recognition

of similarity (*Upamāna*); and authoritative assertion (*Śabda*). These are the only four divisions of *Pramāna* known to the Nyāya. The Vedantists recognize two other methods of evidence, *viz.*, inference from circumstances (*Arthapatti*) and non-perception or negative proof (*Anupalabdhi*), which are included in the main division of inductive generalizations.

Prameya signifies all the objects and subjects of thought of which a correct knowledge may be obtained by means of the above four kinds of evidence or *Pramāna*. The Vedantists recognize several varieties of *Prameya*. Their latest doctrine on the subject which is now generally adopted is explained below in the form of a dialogue.

Q. If *Prameya* be defined as whatever is cognizable, then the four kinds of evidence or *Pramāna* being cognizable subjects, come under the category of *Prameya*, and are the instruments of their own knowledge. For if there are other instruments of their knowledge, they should be recognized as additional kinds of evidence or *Pramāna*. Again, what is the instrument of a knowledge of these additional kinds of evidence?

A. The four kinds of evidence or *Pramāna* described above are the instruments of a know-

ledge of all objects and subjects of thought, including the four divisions of *Pramána*, which are as much the subjects of thought as the others.

Explanation:—A lighted lamp shows not only other objects but also it shows itself. It does not require another light to 'prove its existence. Similarly the above-mentioned four kinds of *Pramána* are the instruments of knowledge of other objects as well as of their own knowledge. If other kinds of *Pramána* be recognized, then these should be additional kinds of *Pramána*, or 'instruments by which their knowledge may be obtained. This will be reasoning *ad infinitum* (*anabasthá*) without the hope of a conclusion. Hence the four kinds of *Pramána* described above are the instruments of their own knowledge.

Q. If the four kinds of evidence or *Pramána* are of themselves things proven, then their discussion would not admit of doubt, as would happen in the case of a tree or a man. For it would be a contradiction in terms, to suppose that a thing proved was still susceptible of doubt.

A. What you say is true, but you must admit that so long as there is not a right perception of an object by its conjunction with an organ of sense, there must be possibility of doubt.

The four kinds of evidence or *Pramāna*, based on the conjunction of a sense with its object, have been described above. So long as this conjunction is not complete, there is chance of doubt.

Pramāya, or the objects of thought are of two kinds, *viz.*, positive, or that which is (*bhāvā*), and negative, or that which is not (*abhāva*); in other words, existence and non-existence, or negation. There are six varieties of the former which is viewed as either eternal or non-eternal. In the form of an atom (*Paramānu*) it is eternal and indestructible; in that of a product formed by the aggregation of atoms, it is called non-eternal. An atom may be defined to be an ultimate form of matter.

Explanation:—When a ray of light is thrown into a room through a chink in the wall, motes or small particles of matter are seen floating in it. Each of these particles is called an atom.

Q. But the motes or small particles observed floating in the sunbeam may have their invisible component parts which should be viewed as atoms properly, so-called and not the particles referred to.

A. *Paramānu* is derived from *parama*, ultimate, and *anu*, part, and is an infinitesimally small particle of matter than which a smaller

particle could not be. If you contend that the particles seen in a sunbeam are divisible, *i. e.*, have parts, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as atoms, then how is it that they are not visible? Also, how do you know that they have parts?

Hence atoms are as I have defined them, and grosser things than atoms are aggregates of atoms. If you define them otherwise, then I ask by which of your senses do you perceive an atom? If you say that it can only be conceived by the mind and that its existence cannot be proved by the senses, then point out which of our senses conveys a notion of it to the mind. If you answer that what the mind first perceives by the eye, is a gross object, and then gradually contemplates its visible parts and lastly conceives its invisible parts, then you must explain by what process the mind jumps from the contemplation of a visible to that of an invisible object. For the existence of a visible object is a matter of evidence, while that of an invisible object is not. Again, a thing beyond the reach of the senses cannot be divided, and its existence cannot be proved as a matter of evidence. If it cannot be perceived by the senses, it cannot be an atom. Hence an atom is an ultimate particle of matter eternal and indivisible. It is earth in miniature.

The six kinds of existence, or predicaments are substance (*dravya*); quality (*guna*), action (*karma*), genus (*sámánya*), specific difference (*viśhesa*), and co-inherence (*samaváya*). They are defined as follows:—

Substance is the site of the qualities and of action, or that in which the qualities abide; and that in which action takes place. Substances are nine in number, *viz.*; earth (*príthivi*), water (*jala*), light (*tejas*), air (*váyu*), ether (*ákása*), time (*kála*), space (*dik*), soul (*átma*), and mind (*manas*). Earth is that in which there is the quality of odour. Earth, as a product, or an aggregate of atoms, is of three kinds, *viz.*, organized body (*sarira*), to be enjoyed, organ of sense (*indriya*), being the instrument of enjoyment, and inorganic mass (*vishaya*), to be enjoyed. Organic earthly bodies remain on the earth. One half of their constituent parts is composed of earth, the other half of water, light, air, and ether. The sense, the percipient of odour, called smell (*ghrána*), resides in the nose. It is the organ of the perception of fragrance and stench, and the instrument of the enjoyment or otherwise derived from that organ. That on which houses are built, that on which we sow corn, that on which we live and move, constitutes mass or inorganic earth. Similarly,

water and light and air are also eternal as atoms and transient as aggregates. On the dissolution of nature, they resolve into their component parts, or atoms. The non-eternal substances are of three kinds, of which examples have been given above. Similarly, water which is eternal as atoms and non-eternal as aggregates, is also of three kinds, according to the division of body, sense, and mass. The sense, the percipient of, savour, called taste, resides in the forepart of the tongue. It is the instrument of the perception of the six varieties of taste, *viz.*, sweetness, acidity, pungency, bitterness, astringency, and salineness. Organic aqueous bodies live in great waters. They are composed of water which forms one half their constituent parts, and of earth, light, air and ether, which compose the other half. Inorganic water in the form of masses is used for the purpose of bathing and drinking, &c. Similarly, the organic luminous body abides in the sun. As above, it is partly composed of the other four elements. The sense, the percipient of color, called sight, resides in the eye. It is the instrument of the perception of the following colors:—*viz.*, white, blue, yellow, green, red, orange, and variegated, *i. e.* formed by mixing the other six colors. Inorganic

light is considered four-fold, *viz.*, (1) Earthy (residing in earthy fuels); (2) celestial or ethereal, (such as lightnings and meteors), whose fuel is watery; (3) atonic (which digests food and drink, and which, in the absence of food and drink, consumes the humours of the body, its constituent parts, such as blood, bones, muscles, fat, &c., and the breath of life), and (4) mineral (such as gems, diamonds, and other precious stones which constitute inorganic light). Similarly, air is formless but tangible. In the form of products or aggregates, it is partly composed of the other four elements. The aerial body is in the aerial world. The sense, the percipient of tangibility, called touch, exists in the skin, which pervades the whole body. By it we perceive what is hot or cold, or temperate. The mass resides in the body and is variously named according to the part of the body which is its seat, *viz.*, (1) respiration, (*prāna*), which is ascending, and of which the seat is the nostril; (2) expiration (*udāna*), ascending from the throat; (3) inspiration, or otherwise explained flatus (*apāna*), which is descending, and which issues from the lower extremity of the intestine; (4) digestion, or abdominal air (*samāns*) of which the seat is the middle of the body; and (5) flatuousness

(*viyána*), which is diffused through the body, passing by all the veins and arteries. The air which is outside our body is the cause of all other atmospheric phenomena. Ether is eternal, because it is infinite. What is infinite is indestructible, as also what is minute and ultimate. What is neither infinite, nor minute and ultimate, is destructible. This is law. Shadow is the ethereal body. The sense is the hearing, the percipient of sound, and resides in the cavity of the ear. The mass is inside our body (*vacuum*). It is ubiquitous, being found inside and outside of things.

The cause of what has been and will be, is time. It is infinite, eternal and indestructible. It is the cause of the mutation of things.

The cause of the use of the terms *near* and *far* is called space. That which is neither high, nor low, but extends in all other directions, is called space. Though one, it receives eight designations, as east, west, north, south, *etc.*, by association with another object. It is infinite and indestructible.

The Soul is infinite, solitary, and the substratum of knowledge. It is the conscious recipient of the knowledge conveyed by the five organs of sense and the exciter of the organs of action, such as the tongue, the

hands, the feet, the organs of generation and excretion. There are various hypotheses as to its existence or non-existence, as to its being finite or infinite, or commensurate with the body. According to the *Naiyāyikas*, it is of two kinds, *viz.*, the animal soul and the supreme soul. The animal soul is different in different bodies, and is infinite; the body is subject to change; but the animal soul is immutable. The Supreme Soul is one, infinite, and Lord of all, and is the dispenser of reward and retribution. The knowledge of the supreme soul is the ultimate aim of all science. Volumes have been written about it, and the subject will be treated in a separate treatise. The organ which is the cause of perception of pleasure and pain is called the mind. It is extremely small, as an atom, and hence indestructible. The conjunction of the mind and the soul is the source of knowledge. In sleep the external organs of sense and action are at rest, when dreams are produced by the mind. It is different in different bodies. It is eternal because it is indestructible.

Of Qualities.

The twenty-four qualities are—Form (*rūpa*), flavour (*rasa*), odour (*gandha*), sound (*śabda*),

tangibility (*sparsha*), number (*sankhyá*), dimension (*parimána*), severality (*prithakwa*), conjunction (*samyoga*), disjunction (*vibhága*), priority (*paratwa*), posteriority (*aparatwa*), weight (*gurutwa*), fluidity (*dravatwa*), viscosity or unctuousity (*sneha*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duksha*), desire (*ichchhá*), aversion (*dvesha*), intelligence (*budbhi*), volition (*prayatna*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), and faculty (*sanskára*).

The above-mentioned twenty-four qualities reside in the nine substances referred to. Each of them belongs to a particular genus. (1) That quality which is only discerned by the sense of sight is called form (*rúpa*). (2) That quality which is perceived only by the sense of taste is called savour (*rasa*), which is of six kinds, *viz.*, sweet, acid, pungent, saline, bitter and astringent. It resides in earth. (3) That quality which is only apprehended by the sense of smell is odour (*gandha*). It also resides in earth. (4) That quality which is apprehended only by the sense of hearing is sound (*śabda*). It resides only in ether, and is of two kinds, articulate and inarticulate. (5) That quality which is apprehended only by the sense of touch is tangibility (*sparsha*), and is of three kinds, through the distinctions of cold, hot and temperate, *i. e.*, neither cold nor hot. It abides in

earth, water, light and air. Temperateness resides in earth and air. Coldness, warmth, and temperateness or maturity (2) alternate in [the temperature of] earth. (6) Number (*sankhyá*) is the reason of the use of one, two, &c. It abides in all the nine substances. Numbers are reckoned from unity to infinity. Unity is both eternal and non-eternal. It is eternal in eternal things and non-eternal in non-eternal things; but duality, and the like, are always non-eternal. (7) Dimension (*parimāna*) is the cause of the use of the terms—it is *long*, it is *broad*, &c. It is present in all the nine substances. It is eternal and non-eternal according as it resides in eternal substances or non-eternal substances. It is of four kinds through the distinctions of minutely small, great, long, and short. (8) The cause of the employment of such an expression as, “*This is distinct from that*,” is severality (*prīthakva*). It is present in all substances. (9) The cause of the employment of such expressions as, “*These two are one, and without alloy*,” is called conjunction (*samyoga*). It is present in all substances. (10) The quality which separates things conjoined is disjunction (*vibhāga*). It is either causative or non-causative. The separation of the stalk from the root of the lotus is a case of causative dis-

junction, for they cannot be re-united, while the opening of the petals of the lotus by day, and their closing by night, is a case of non-causative disjunction. Disjunction is a quality of substance of all kinds. (11) That which causes the employment of the terms *small* and *great*, *far* and *near*, is called priority. It is of eleven kinds, through the three divisions of time into past, present and future, and the eight cardinal points. It abides in all substances. (12) Priority and posteriority are used in reference to time and space (*direction*). In respect of space, priority means distance, and posteriority means proximity. In regard to time, priority signifies greatness, and posteriority smallness. They are qualities which reside in earth, water, light and air. (13) The quality which causes an object in the act of falling, to fall first, *i. e.*, (before another falling body) is called weight (*gurutva*). It affects earth and water. (14) Fluidity (*dravatva*) is the cause of the flowing of particles. It is of two kinds, innate (*sānsiddhika*) and adscititious (*nāsvatā'nainimitvika*). Innate or natural fluidity resides in water. The fluidity caused by the application of heat is called adscititious. Adscititious fluidity belongs to earth and light, such as the fluidity of butter and of gold, *etc.* (15) The quali-

ty which is the cause why the particles, and the like, become a heap is viscidty or unctuosity (*sucha*). This quality resides in water alone. A heap or lump caused by the aggregation of particles of *ghṛe* (clarified butter) melts or spreads by the applization of heat. (16) What all perceive to be agreeable, and what is desired, by all is pleasure (*sukha*). It abides in the soul. In the Supreme Soul it is eternal, in the animal soul it is transient. (17) What all perceive to be disagreeable, and is dreaded by all, is called pain (*duksha*). It only affects the animal soul. (18) That from which pleasure springs and which causes a cessation of pain is called desire (*ichchhá*). It resides in the soul. In the Supreme Soul it is eternal, while in the animal soul it is transient. (19) Aversion (*dvesha*) is the instinct to avoid a thing. It is a quality of the animal soul. That which is the cause of all applications (intellections) is intelligence (*buddhi*), or knowledge (*jñána*). It resides in the soul. In the Supreme Soul it is eternal—in the animal, it is transient. (21) Volition (*prayatna*) is the effort or determination to do a thing. It resides in the soul. In the Supreme Soul it is eternal—in the animal, it is transient. (22) Moral merit or virtue (*dharma*) is the cause of eternal happiness. It

abides in the animal soul. (23) Moral demerit or vice (*adharma*) is the cause of misery. It also abides in the animal soul. (24) Faculty (*sanskára*) is the totality of the qualities of velocity, elasticity and imagination. It is of three kinds. Velocity is the cause of action and it is a quality of the mental organ, as well as of the four elements of earth, water, light and air.

Imagination (*bhāvaná*) is the faculty by which we recall past notions (mental objects), and which being excited produces remembrance. It is a quality of the soul. Elasticity (*sthiti-sthāpakatá*) is the quality whereby an altered thing is restored to its pristine state, as a strained branch is restored to its former position. It resides in earth, water, light and air.

Now we will sum up the particular qualities affecting each of the above nine elementary substances. To earth belong the qualities of form, savour, odour, tangibility, number, dimension, severality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, weight, fluidity and faculty.

Substituting viscosity for odour, the above-mentioned fourteen qualities also characterize water. To light belong all the qualities of earth, excepting odour, savour and weight. Gold, sil-

ver, diamond, and other precious stones owe their weight to mixture of earth in their composition. The qualities of air are tangibility, number, dimension, severality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority and faculty. To ether belong the qualities of sound, number, dimension, severality, conjunction, and disjunction. To time and space belong all the above qualities excepting sound. To the soul belong the nine qualities of intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and faculty, in addition to the five qualities which characterize space. To the Supreme Soul belong the eight qualities of intelligence, desire, volition, number, dimension, severality, conjunction, and disjunction.

Of Action.

Action is of five sorts, *viz.*, elevation, (*utkshepana*, literally, throwing upwards), depression (*adhakshepana*, literally, throwing downwards), contraction (*ákunchana*), dilation (*prasáрана*), going, or motion in general, (*gamana*). By differentiation, each of these five kinds of action is referred to a particular genus, and abides in earth, water, air, light and wind. Their effect is transient and is seen in visible objects; and is unseen in invisible

objects. Elevation, *etc.* (motion of all kinds) is the result of conjunction and impetus; for example,—when you throw a stone, it is carried a certain distance. (It is the result of velocity). On the first moment, there is incipient motion. On the second instant, the stone separates from the hand.^a On the third instant, the stone leaves its original position. On the fourth instant, the stone reaches its destination. On the fifth instant, there is a fresh conjunction after annulment of a prior conjunction. All other kinds of action are included in the term motion. Hence, they are not separately treated here.

Of Community (genus).

That which is one, eternal, and belonging to more than one; being a property common to several, is called a genus, (*sámánya*) *Játi*. Three degrees of it are distinguished; the highest (*para*), the lowest (*apara*), and the intermediate (*parápara*.) It abides in substance, in quality and in action. The highest degree of community, or supreme genus, is existence. For example, the existence of the Supreme Soul. The lowest degree of community is individuality, such as the individuality of a jar, *etc.*, which is an abstraction of an individual. The

degree of community or genus to which qualities and action belong is lower than that of existence and higher than that of earth, and other elements. For example, the genus to which palaces belong, etc. Things which do not admit of degrees of community are noted below.

There can be no genus in the case of an object which is one and individual; for example, time and ether. Nor in the case of two species comprising the self-same individuals. For example, *pakshitva*, or the species of the winged (things), and *khecharatva*; the species of things that live and move in the air, cannot be referred to a genus; because both species comprise the self-same individuals (birds).

Beatitude (*kalyāna*) has no genus; nor has *indriyatva*, the peculiar quality or junction of an organ. The earth being a compound of water and other elements, cannot be referred to a genus. In chaos, the five elements exist in the form of atoms. Creation is the result of their aggregation, which is regulated by the law of homogeneity. One kind of atoms will not be joined to atoms of another kind. This is called particularity. It is the quality which distinguishes. We see no reason to recognise the speciality of particularity; for there cannot be generic ab-

straction without individuals. Similarly, there cannot be a generic abstraction of the relation of intimacy or coinherence; for intimate relation or coinherence is one constant connection.

Conclusion.

Doubt (*samsaya*) forms a separate category; because it is distinct from *pramāṇa* or evidence, and *pramāya*, or the objects of thought.

Motive (*prayojana*) is the reason by which a person is actuated or moved to action. It is not of one kind, and hence it is treated as a separate category.

Instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) is in a controversy a topic on which both disputants consent. It is not of one kind, and hence it is treated as a separate category.

Established conclusion (*siddhānta*) is that which is admitted by all. It is not of one kind, and hence it is treated as a separate category.

A member or part [of a complete syllogism] is called (*avayava*). It is not of one kind, and hence it is treated as a separate category.

Disputation (*tarka*) is not of one kind, and hence it is treated as a separate category.

Ascertainment or determination of birth (*nirṇaya*) is the result of evidence. It has been treated as a separate category.

Controversy (*vāda*) is the interlocution of persons, communing on a topic in pursuit of truth.

Wrangling (*Jalpa*) is the debate of the disputants contending for victory, without regard to the right or the wrong side of a question.

Cavilling (*vitanda*) is discussion wherein a disputant seeks to confute his opponent without offering to support a position of his own.

Fallacy (*hetvāvāsha*) is the substance of reason, but not the true reason of a thing. Fallacies have different names and definitions, such as unreal reason, (*asiddha*), which need not be here set forth. They are only hypotheses advanced by Nyayāikās of various schools.

Quibbling or misconstruction (*chhala*) is finding fault with an argument by taking verbal exceptions. Futility (*jāti*) is a false or self-confuting answer.

The reason by which an adversary is defeated is called conclusion (*nigrahasthān*).

The sixteen categories have now been succinctly treated. A right knowledge of them is calculated to give an insight into the motives of human conduct, teach the exercise of sound discretion in all matters, and lead to the attainment of final beatitude.







